University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1997

Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?
Stephen B. Burbank
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the American Politics Commons, Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Law and
Politics Commons, Legal Commons, Legal Theory Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Repository Citation
Burbank, Stephen B., "Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?" (1997). Faculty
Scholarship at Penn Law. 943.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/943

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

IMPLEMENTING
PROCEDURAL
CHANGE:
WHO, HOW, WHY,AND WHEN?
Stephen B. Burbank*

What does it mean to "implement procedural change"? On a
narrow view, the question concerns only the fate of a new or
different procedural norm or technique once it has been conceived. Yet, as the RAND Report makes clear,' both in its discussion of the literature on organizational change and in its application of insights from that literature to the performance of
the federal judiciary under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
(the CJRA),2 the nature and extent of procedural implementation in that narrow sense cannot usefully be considered without
reference either to the source of the impulse/directive to change
or to the process by which that impulseldirective came into being.
More generally, a consideration of procedural change should
include attention to the actors responsible for conceiving it and
carrying it out (Who?); the processes by which the responsible
actors conceive it and carry it out (How?); the reasons for, and
information underlying, the impulseldirective to change (Why?);
and the occasions on which action should be taken (When?).
Reflection upon the CJRA, the events that led up to it, and
the events that it initiated, has much to offer those who are
interested in civil justice reform-which is to say, I hope, all of
us--on each of these questions. Moreover, contrary to what may

* David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of
Pennsylvania. Charles Geyh, Anthony Scirica, and Norma Shapiro provided helpful
comments on a draft of this Article.
ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST,
1. JAMES S.
SPEEDY,AND INEXPENSIVE?AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL
CASEhhNAGEMENT UNDER
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT 51-55 (1996) [hereinafter RANI) REPORT].
2. CiviI Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (cod.fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994)).
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be fast becoming conventional wisdom, the RAND Report makes
a contribution to our knowledge on all of them.
Viewed retrospectively, the CJRA demonstrates the importance of early and ongoing cooperation between the federal judiciary and the Congress in responding to calls for procedural
change. "Cooperationn for these purposes requires (1)genuine
dialogue, rather than pro forma consultation; (2) restraint in
assertions about power, prerogatives, and competence; and (3)
willingness to compromi~e.~
Viewed contemporaneously-that is with the benefit of the
RAND Report-the CJRA demonstrates both that which limits
and the limits of procedural reform. That which limited the
CJRA reforms included the legislation's vague wording, which
was emblematic both of compromises made during the legislative process and of its weak empirical foundation. It also included Congress' failure to work with the judiciary in the process of
identifjing the need for change and in the preliminary identification of promising remedies, and the judiciary's consequent
failures of leadership when it came time to carry out the negotiated compromises. These failures of leadership rendered impossible changes in the local legal culture of the practicing bar,
whose commitment to the CJRA is also subject to q ~ e s t i o n . ~
As to the limits of procedural reform, the judiciary has reason to stress the Report's finding that "[ilssues unrelated to
judicial case management account for 95 percent of the variation
in litigation costs.n5Yet, the larger significance of that finding
may lie in confirming both the fatuousness of claims by either
the judiciary or the Congress to exclusive competence or power
in this arena, and the importance of cooperation in the search
for solutions to the problem of litigation costs. Moreover, as the
Report also suggests, the cooperation necessary for effective
reform must include the practicing bar.6
The RAND Report also demonstrates what social scientists
have long realized, but which so oRen comes as news to those
3. See infia text accompanying notes 11-72.
4. See infia text accompanying notes 73-105.
5. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Rand Study Finds 95% of Cost in
Civil Litigation Outside Courts' Control 1-2 (Jan. 29, 1997) (News Release) [hereinafter News Release].
6. See infia text accompanying notes 90-95.
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unfamiliar with empirical research; namely, the limits of such
research as an aid to lawmaking.' However, particularly since
there may be a tendency to emphasize, and perhaps to misapprehend, the Report's finding that only very few procedural
techniques had a statistically significant effect on measures of
interest, it is important to note respects in which those limited
findings may have broader significance.'
Viewed prospectively, the CJRA, the process it initiated in
the federal judiciary, and the experience under it as reflected in
the RAND Report, all confirm my view that the urgent need now
is for dialogue at a point anterior to actual lawmaking, dialogue
concerning "where we have been, where we are going and where
we should be goinfg in procedural law reform.
Whether or not one acknowledges that, in order to be effective, the effort to bring about consequential procedural reform
must be broader than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, both
the processes that led to the CJRA and recent amendments to
the Federal Rules and the results of those "reformsn should
sffice to persuade that the status quo is unacceptable. Moreover, both experiences should also sffice to persuade that the
dialogue must include the practicing bar, which may have the
power to defeat change, if not when it is proposed, then when it
is put in place.''

A. Life (in Court) Before the CJRA
Complaints about cost and delay in the courts are probably
as old as courts themselves." In this country, and in connection
with the federal courts, such complaints have periodically fueled
7. E.g., Richard 0.Lempert, "Between Cup and Lip": Social Science Influences
on Law and Policy, 10 LAW & POLV 167 (1988).
8. See infia text accompanying notes 96-104.
9. Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 855 (1993) (footnote omitted).
10. See infia text accompanying notes 106-29.
11. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popuhr Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, in THE POUNDCONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE
FUrURE 337 (A.Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
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efforts to bring about procedural change.
The major reform effort in this century lasted more than
thirty years, and it brought us both the Rules Enabling Act in
1934 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.12Those
events represented a major shift in the locus of power to govern
procedure in actions at law in the federal trial courts-from the
legislative to the judicial branch-what I have elsewhere described as "a power grab by the judiciary, [and] one that was
remarkably successful for many years."13
The success of the Federal Rules and of the Enabling Act
process that brought them forth was attributable, I believe, to
(1) the loose texture of Federal Rules, (2) the long-enduring
disposition of federal trial judges to leave '%he real power in
litigation with lawyers and their clients,"" and (3) a related
point, the relative homogeneity of the federal bench and of the
bar that practiced before it.''
Recent years have brought shifts in the locus of power, both
in fashioning the rules of the litigation game (or its alternatives)
and in directing the game as it is played. In my view, the latter
shift-in which power moved from lawyers and their clients to
judges-was influential in precipitating the former-in which
power moved from the federal judiciary to Congress.16
In seeking the causes of, and the critical events that precipitated, the shift in the locus of effective power in federal litigation from lawyers (and their clients) to judges, I have been
drawn to the phenomenon we know as complex litigation and to
the breakdown in the homogeneity of the federal bench and bar.
Complex litigation became a catalytic force with the electrical equipment antitrust cases in the 1950s and the institutions
and techniques that were developed to handle the perceived

12. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U . Pk L.

REV. 1015, 1035-98 (1982).
13. See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGALEDUC.513, 513
(1996); Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Pmt: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOKL. REV. 1, 14 (1988).
14. Burbank, supra note 13, at 514.
15. "Since abuses are in the eye of the beholder, and since federal judges and
practitioners for many years had the same vision, there were few perceived abuses."
Id.
16. The CJRA is perhaps the most notorious, but not necessarily the most important, example.
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crisis that those cases posed for the federal judiciary. The institutions and techniques in question, which included the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation17 and the Manual for Complex
Litigation,'* empowered judges "at the expense of others, including lawyers, litigants, and juries."lg They furnished models
when the perceived crisis of expense and delay in the federal
courts became more widespread in the 1970s.
The federal judiciary was once an elite and relatively homogeneous group, sharing much by way of background, education,
and worldview with the lawyers who practiced before it. The
social revolution of the 1960s, the quest for diversity on the
bench it initiated, and changes in the legal profession brought
about both by that revolution and by the revolution of competition all may have contributed to the dissolution of the ties that
bound bench and bar, which ties included shared professional
values and a shared sense of abusive c0nduct.2~
Although the disintegration of the legal profession, in the
sense of a professional elite with shared values, was already
well underway in the 1970s, it was true then, as it true today,
that public images of the practice of law are disproportionately
shaped by a small proportion of lawyers whose own experiences
and interests determine the nature of those images?' And so,
complex litigation in federal courts became the dominant image,
and the late 1970s witnessed a sustained outcry by the American Bar Association against excessive cost and delay, particularly in di~covery.~~

17. See 28 U.S.C. Q 1407 (1994).
18. See Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases,
25 F.R.D. 351 (1960); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(1969); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(2d ed. 1985); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(3d ed. 1995).
19. Burbank, supra note 13, at 515.
20. See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at
War with the Profession and its Values, 59 BROOK L. REV. 931 (1993). See also
A. POSNER,OVERCOMING
LAW 63-70 (1995) (discussing changes in the legal
RICHARD
profession).
21. See, e.g., Marc S. Galanter, The Day Af)er the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD.
L, REV. 3 (1986); Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We
Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
ABA, REPORTOF THE SPEC- C O M M I T T E E
22. See, e.g., SECTIONOF LITIGATION,
FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY
ABUSE (19771, reprinted in 92 F.R.D. 149 (1982);
Amendments to Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 998, 1000. (1980)
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Faced with requests from p o w e f i forces within the bar to
save lawyers from themselves, and having regard "to their own
professional interests as well as to the interests of practicing
lawyers, litigants, and society,"23federal judges generalized the
models that had been developed for managing unusual cases,
models that empowered them. They also brought to center stage
a variety of techniques for d i s e m p o w e ~ glawyers and their
clients that had previously been only bit players in the theater
of litigation: sanctions for litigation abuse.% Their task in doing
so was made easier by a shift in the composition of the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee. Originally composed primarily of distinguished members of the practicing bar and academics, by the
1970s that committee came to be dominated by federal judges.2S
From this perspective, it is no coincidence that at the very
time when the federal judiciary was wresting power from lawyers (and their clients) by putting in place general rules that not
only enabled but encouraged trial judges to take control of all
civil litigation and required them to root out abuse, the judiciary
began to lose what had been essentially a monopoly of power to
fashion the rules of the game. And from this perspective, contrary to conventional wisdom, it may not have been the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which did not survive the Enabling Act process, that marked the critical event, but rather the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which did survive
that process.

(Powell, J., dissenting statement) (criticizing 1980 amendments to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as a "compromisen and as "tinkering changesn).
The result is a picture of the dispute landscape sadly lacking in perspective,
and the problem is not simply empirical. The rhetorical tendency of the 'litigation explosionn story is to deflect attention from values other than efficient
administration in the effort to end the "crisis," dam the "flood," or stem the
"avalanche."
Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1467-68
(1987) (book review).
23. Burbank, supra note 13, a t 515 (footnote omitted).
24. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformution of American Civil Procedure:
The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank,
Transformation]; Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOPSTRAL. REV.
997 (1983) bereinafter Burbank, Sanctions].
25. See Laura Kaster & Kenneth Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators,
NAT'LL.J., Aug. 17, 1992, a t 15; Burbank, supra note 9, a t 847-48.
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To be sure, the Federal Rules of Evidence marked a sharp
break with the past in that Congress refused to acquiesce in
proposals coming to it from the Supreme Court under the Enab@g Act?6 Moreover, it may be that the significance of
Congress' insistence on its own prerogatives transcended the
occasion, breaking the spell of forty years in a defining psychological moment and forever putting Congress on guard against
judicial overreaching.
Overreach the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence certainly
did, notably (but not exclusively) in the provisions regarding
testimonial privileges, and that probably explains why Congress
decided to treat the proposed rules as if they were proposed
legislation?' But, apart from recognizing that the existence and
content of evidentiary privileges are of intense interest and
importance to many groups in society, we should also remember
that this was the first comprehensive attempt to reform the law
of evidence in the federal courts. In light of the law applicable
before that time, it was a project comparable in ambition and
scope to the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Pr~cedure.~'Even if
one sees in Congress' anxiety about the short amount of time
available to review such a project under the Enabling Act29portents of its reaction to continuing refinements to a system that
had been put in place in 1938, it is hard to see there portents of
an appetite for broad legislation governing dispute resolution in
the federal courts. Indeed, through a reform effort culminating
in the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act, Congress sought
to ensure that it would not have to become actively involved by
mandating changes in the process by which Federal Rules are
promulgated and by seeking to forestall o~erreaching.~~

26. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1018, 1020; see also Charles G. Geyh, Paradise
Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary% Imperiled Role i n Congress, 7 1
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1187-88 (1996) (discussing the end of judicial control over the
promulgation of procedural rules).
27. Burbank, supra note 12, at 1137-43, 1187, 1190.
28. Id. at 1137-43; see also Jack B. Weinstein, The UniformiEy-ConformityDilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM.L. REX. 353 (1969)
(analyzing the choices faced by the drafters of the Rules of Evidence).
29. H.R REP. NO. 93-650, at 3-4 (1973).
30. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-52 (1988)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. $8 2071 et seq.); Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the
Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and "Procedure" i n the Rules
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Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence may have marked the
beginning of the end of the judiciary's monopoly of power t o
fashion the rules of the game. But, I believe, it was the poisonous environment fostered by the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 11, that set the
stage for the more recent, and much more serious, power struggles: Those amendments became effective, it is true, but only
just barely, the House having passed legislation to prevent them
taking effect on August 1,and the Senate bill not coming to the
floor in time.31In any event, to the extent that the controversy
they engendered resulted from overreaching or from a failure of
the process, one could have hoped that the 1988 amendments to
the Enabling Act would prevent a reoccurrence. The damage was
done, however, as the controversy that had preceded their effective date continued-indeed intensified-thereafter, pitting lawyers against lawyers, lawyers against clients, and judges against
both.32
And so, by the end of the 1980s, not only had the legal profession disintegrated in the throes of competition, but lawyers
were at each others' throats in the courtroom as well as the
marketplace, and some of them had come to resent federal judges for taking away their control of litigation and setting them
against their colleagues and sometimes their clients. The myth
of procedure as the neutral facilitator of the substantive law had
been exploded, not just by the Federal Rules of Evidence, but by
proposals more clearly within the heartland of procedure, including the 1983 amendments and proposals to amend Rule 68.%
Members of Congress were by then accustomed to lobbying by
interests opposed to or favoring proposed amendments and thus
were encouraged to view rules of procedure as a magnet, if not
for constituent interests, then for special interest^.^^ The federal judiciary was without many Mends just as civil justice reform

Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1029-36.
31. See Burbank, Transformcrtwn, supra note 24, at 1948 n.119.
32. See GREGORYP. JOSEPH,SANCTIONS:
THE FEDERAL
LAW OF LITIGATION
ABUSE 1-52(2d ed. 1994); Burbank, supra note 9, at 844 n.22.
33. See Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68 - Time to Abandon
Ship, 19 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM425 (1986).
34. See Geyh, supra note 26, at 1187-88, 1227; Paul D. Carrington, The New
Order in Judicial Rulemuking, 75 JUDICATURE
161 (1991).
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writ large became a national political issue.
B. The CJRA in Context
The CJRA was the product of mistakes on the part of both
the Congress and the judiciary, which, if only because they attended the conception, progress, and passage of proposed legislation, can properly be called political mistakes.
It is no reproach to Senator Biden that, a t a time when big
business chose to make civil justice reform a national political
issue-and with it reform of court procedure-he responded to
the drumbeat of calls for a n end to excessive expense and delay
in civil litigation by seeking to assume a leadership role on the
i~sues.3~
Nor should he be faulted for seeking guidance fkom a
broad-based and thoughtful group of court users, the Brookings
Task F ~ r c e ; ~quite
'
the contrary. Finally in this aspect, it
should not be surprising that when the Task Force achieved
substantial consensus on the existence of, and promising methods of solving, problems in the federal courts, Senator Biden
deemed that a n adequate foundation for proposed legi~lation.3~
There were, however, numerous mistakes made a t this, the
conception stage of implementing procedural change. They relate
to the Who, the How, the Why, and the When.
As to the Who and the How, it was a mistake for Senator
Biden not to ensure that the group convened to advise him included substantial representation of sitting federal judges.* It
is no answer to that criticism that federal judges dominated the
Enabling Act process, which had failed to come to grips with the
problems, because inquiry as to the existence, nature, and extent
of problems was presumably the fist order of business for the

35. "Senator Biden is not a captive of the insurance industry any more than he
is the son of a Welsh coal miner. He is a politician who wanted a statute on civil
justice reform." Burbank, supra note 9, a t 852 (footnotes omitted).
REFORM, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING
COSTS
36. TASK FORCEON CIVIL JUSTICE
AND DELAYIN CIVIL LITIGATION vii (BROOKINGS,
1989) hereinafter BROOKINGS
TASK
FORCEREPORT].
37. See S. 2027, lOlst Cong. (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 15 (1990).
38. The Brookings Task Force did not include a sitting federal judge. Four
members out of thirty-six had a t one time served on the federal bench. See
BROOKINGS
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 36, a t 45-49.
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group, and because two wrongs do not make a right. By the late
1980s it should have been apparent to everyone that federal
judges and the practicing bar may have very different notions as
to what is wrong with the civil justice system and what, if anything, should be done about it?'
Moreover, Congress was just then concluding the most consequential overhaul of the Enabling Act process since 1934.40
One might have thought that a freshly revised treaty, animated
in part by Congress' expressed desire to disengage, would suggest the need closely to consult the judiciary about a possible
breach of that treaty, if not to forbear from such a breach altogether. And if it was in part dissatisfaction with the pace of
change through the Enabling Act process that animated Congress:' let us remember that some significant measure of that
pace was due to changes made in anticipation of the 1988 legi~lation.~~
At the point when the Brookings Task Force issued its report, and i n light of the nature of its recommendations, another
mistake was made in immediately translating those recommendations into proposed legi~lation.~~
For, whatever the merits,
the basic thrust of the group's work-reform from the "bottom
~p"~~-was
radically at odds with one of the basic premises of
modern federal procedure?' Perhaps more to the point, given
that by the 1980s uniformity could reasonably have been
thought a myth,'"j the federal judiciary was in the midst of a
serious and well-publicized effort, encouraged by Congress, to
discipline disuniformity at the local level?' "Consultation" in

39. See supra text accompanying notes 23-34.
40. See supra text accompanying note 30.
41. See Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54
U W & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 105, 11416 (1991).
42. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 27 (19881, reprinted i n 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,
5987-88 [hereinafter 1988 HOUSE REPORT^ see also Geyh, supra note 26, at 1189
n.124 (stating that the 1988 amendments only codified what was already an existing
practice).
43. See supra text accompanying note 37.
44. BROOKINGS
TASKFORCEREPORT,supra note 36, at 11.
45. See, e.g., Burbank, Transfomtion, supra note 24, at 1929-41.
46. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules:
Uniformity, Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999,
2018-21 (1989).
47. See Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role of Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62
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the form of inviting comment on proposed legislation can be, or
be perceived to be, akin to negotiating with a gun to the head.
The federal judiciary was hardly blameless at this stage,
however. I will not speak more of the legacy of overreaching,
mythmaking, and constituency disintegration that contributed to
the climate in which procedural reform engaged sustained political interest.48That apart, the judiciary reacted to the proposed
legislation that was founded on the Brookings Task Force Report
in a way that, as Tom Lehrer would have said, was bound to
lead to escalatio. In doing so, they took both the high ground
and the low ground. Unfortunately, both caved in.
On the high ground, although it was certainly appropriate
for the judiciary to remind the Congress of the treaty we call the
Enabling Act, then only recently updated, the judges did not
stop there. They invoked, in addition, the irreducible prerogatives of the federal courts under Article I11 of the Constitution as
a means to dissuade Congress from pr~ceeding.~'
These claims were fatuous, and the fact they have subsequently been elaborated does not make them any less so, although it may conjure up a different meaning of the adjective."
Against a background of overreaching by the rulemakers, and
notwithstanding the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Acts,
repeated invocation of the Enabling Act process to forestall congressional action reaps the "[wlages of [clrying [ w l ~ l f . "Far
~~
worse, however, is to tell Congress what it may hear as an assertion that it has no constitutional business concerning itself
with matters that, notwithstanding the labels we affix to them,
have attracted sustained political interest. In any event, the
strategy backfired, eliciting equally fatuous claims of exclusive

(1989); 1988 HOUSE
REPORT,
supra note 42, at 28-29.
48. See supm text accompanying notes 11-34.
49. For an account of the judiciary's participation in the legislative process leading up to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, see Linda S. Mullenix, The CounterReformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 407-18 (1992).
50. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 850-52; see also Lauren Robel, Fractured
Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1472-83
(1994) (arguing that the CJRA does not violate separation of powers or statutory
limits on Congressional rulemaking).
51. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolfi A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALEL.J. 920 (1973).
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legislative power in the Senate Report on the CJRA.52
On the low ground, the judiciary designated a special task
force of judges to work with the Senate Judiciary Committee in
revising the proposed legislation. Senator Biden, at least,
thought that the process resulted in revisions that were acceptable to the judiciary. He was understandably upset when, thereafter, the Judicial Conference publicly expressed continuing
opposition-based on the views not of the members of the special
task force, but of the Conference's Committee on Judicial Improvements-~~upset that the Senate Report retails a highly
unflattering account.53Perhaps the judiciary may be excused
for naivete as to the rules of the political game, but the lesson is
one they cannot afford to forget.
Finally, as to the Who and the How, we should consider
here another mistake made by the judiciary, not in the process
that led to the CJRA, but as a direct result of that experience. I
refer to the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26 regarding required disclosures." As proposed, these
amendments attracted far more consistently negative comments
from the practicing bar than had the proposals to amend Rule
11 in the early 1 9 8 0 ~The
. ~ ~reaction was so thoroughly negative that, a t one point, the Advisory Committee decided to abandon the enterprise. It was persuaded to take up the cudgels
again, however.
Among the arguments that seem to have carried the day
was the notion that the judiciary needed to reassert its leadership in discovery reform.56This notwithstanding pleas that the
rulemakers await the evaluation of experience under the CJRA
and notwithstanding the fact that the existence of such experimentation required permission in a putatively national rule to
opt out at the local leveL5' The circumstances thus induced a n
unprincipled departure from the norm of uniformity, one that

52. See S. REP.NO. 101-416, at 13-14 (1990).
53. See id. at 6-7.
54. FED.R. CIV. P. 26(a). For a more favorable view of this episode, by one who
was involved in it, see Paul D. Carrington, Learning From the Rule 26 Brouhuha:
Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295 (1994).
55. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 846.
56. See id
57. See id. at 845-46.
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could only doom another expressed goal of the rulemakers in
forging ahead, to wit, bringing about "the cultural change the
Committee sought."*
And who flew the flag of leadership on behalf of the judiciary? Certainly not the Supreme Court of the United States.
I t is difficult . . . not to sense a crisis in federal procedural reform
when the Chief Justice's letter transmitting the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules disclaimed any implication "that the
Court itself would have proposed these amendments in the form
submitted," and when four other Justices indicated their agnosticism about, lack of competence to evaluate or disagreement with,
one or more of the amendments. When a majority of the Supreme
Court has washed its hands of proposed Federal Rules, and when
some of the Justices have aired the dirty Linen, what is it that
should restrain Congress from responding to those who wish to do
the same?59

It is a wonder that the 1993 amendments became effective-another very close callm-and no wonder that the judiciary emerged from the CJRA and immediately following
rulemaking battles with even fewer friends than it had before.61
As to the Why and the When, although it is understandable
that Senator Biden regarded the work of the Brookings Task
Force as adequate foundation for proposed legislation, it is also
regrettable. To be sure, we all know legislation that rests on a
weaker foundation of demonstrated need and efficacious remedy.
Yet, due in large part to the work of Marc Galanter, the mythic
quality of much that parades as fact in debates about civil justice reform has been known for more than a decade.62That it
has been just as widely ignored does not excuse our lawmakers,

58. Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of
Committee Meeting 7 (Apr. 13-15, 1992); Burbank, supra note 9, a t 845 n.30.
59. Burbank, supra note 9, a t 842 (footnotes omitted).
60. See William J. Hughes, Congressional Reaction to the 1993 Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 SETON
HW LEGIS. J. 1, 3-4, 9-11 (1993).
61. See Carrington, supra note 54, a t 295-96.
62. See supm note 21. For an amusing, albeit depressing, experience, compare
Dick Thornburgh, America's Civil Justice Dilemma: The Prospects for Reform, 55 MD.
L. REV. 1074 (1996), with Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote,
55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996). Mr. Thornburgh provides the anecdotes; Professor
Galanter administers the antidote. The juxtaposition, of which Professor Galanter
was, he informs me, ignorant until the issue appeared, is delicious.
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although it does tend to confirm Holrnes' observation that
"[ilgnorance is the best of law reformers."'j3
It is only a partial defense of Congress, if it is a defense a t
all, that the federal judiciary's track record of seeking data before initiating procedural reform had been abysmal and that
what in this account poisoned the rulemaking well-the 1983
amendments to Rule 11-proceeded in a "virtual empirical vacu u ~ n . "For
~ ~ the legislative and rulemaking games are played
by different rules, and at least the latter espouses a norm of
rati~nality.~~
From this perspective, it is not sufiticient that the Brookings
Task Force may have been diverse (apart fkom the exclusion of
active judges)% and achieved substantial consensus on the existence of, and promising remedies for, problems of expense and
delay in federal civil litigation. Just as reputations are a n aggregation of hearsay, so may notions about the universe of litigation
reflect nothing more than the success of cosmic anecdotes in
orbit. "The plural of anecdote is not data."67And in a n information vacuum, opinion surveys, however scientifically conducted,
are worth the data on which the opinions are founded.68
The empirical basis underlying the CJRA is particularly
troublesome when it is recalled that, even if an adequate foundation for lawmaking of some sort, it was hardly such for the
specific recommendations of the Broolrings Task Force, which in
turn became the stuff of proposed legislation with which the
judiciary had to deal in negotiations. Fortunately, most of what
was mandatory in the proposed legislation became hortatory in
the finished produ~t.~'
According to this view, the provisions for
63. OLIVERWENDELLFOLMES,
JR.,THE COMMON
LAW 64 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., 1963). See Burbank, supra note 9, a t 841.
64. Burbank, supra note 9, a t 844.
65. See POSNER, supra note 20, a t 126-35.
66. But see Mullenix, supra note 49, a t 389 n.42 ("Despite the apparent diversity of the task force, its membership was heavily weighted with corporate and insurance interests.")
67. Edith Greene, A Love-Hate Relatwnship, 18 JUST.SYS. J. 99, 100 (1995)
(book review).
68. Both the Brookings Task Force and the Senate Judiciary Committee placed
heavy weight on the results of various s w e y s . See BROOKINGS
TASKFORCEREPORT,
supra note 36, a t 6-7; S. REP. NO. 101-416, a t 6-8 (1990). For criticism of the Actls
empirical basis, see Mullenix, supra note 49, a t 396-97 n.90.
69. See Robel, supra note 50, a t 1450.
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mandatory evaluation that have brought us the RAND Report
may be the CJRA's greatest and most enduring accomplishment,
providing more and more reliable inf0rmation.7~
Finally, in connection with the When (the occasions on
which action should be taken), it bears repeating that the timing
of the CJRA was doubly unfortunate. Coming so closely on the
heels of legislation that culminated a four year effort, led by the
House of Representatives, to reform and discipline the Enabling
Act process," the CJRA, driven by a powertl Senator, could be
viewed as repudiation of the new treaty. And, coming in the
midst of a serious effort by the judiciary to reform and discipline
the process of local rulemaking:2 it could be viewed as repudiation of both that effort and the premise on which it was built:
the continuing vitality of a norm of uniform federal procedure.

Viewed in the light of the RAND Report, the CJRA experience enriches our understanding of procedural change in each of
the four dimensions I have charted.
As to the Who and the How, I have already noted the light
that the RAND Report casts on defining and thinking about
implementing procedural ~hange.7~
One suggestion is that participants in an organizational structure should be involved in a
process that leads to a shared recognition of the need for change
if that change is to be effe~tive.7~
Another is that the leaders of
the enterprise must be not simply involved, but committed-not
the chicken, but the pig, in eggs and bacon." A third is that
effective change requires "clear-cut directive^"^^ and "clearly
specified goals."77
In assessing "the limited degree of change" effected by the

70. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,5 105, 104 Stat.
5089, 5098 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. $5 471-482(1994)).
71. Supra text accompanying notes 30, 40.
72. Supm text accompanying note 47.
73. Supra text accompanying note 1.
74. See RAND REPORT,supm note 1, at 40-44.
75. See id. at 44-45.
76. See id. at 33.
77. See id. at 41.
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CJRA, the RAND Report assigns a major role to the "intentionally vague wording of some of the act's case management principles and techniques," observing that "Mad the act been less
ambiguous, there might have been more ~hange."'~Elsewhere,
the Report suggests that "explicitly stated expectations would
have helped individual districts align their efforts with the objectives of the reform, provided judges and judicial staff with
criteria to use in selecting performance strategies and assessing
progress, and generated energy within and across districts as
members sought to reach clearly specified goals."7g
All of this may be true, but, given what we know of the
process by which the CJRA came into being, greater clarity in
these respects would have been purchased at the cost not just of
a major confrontation, but of a rupture between the legislative
Thus, the failure to seek early and acand judicial bran~hes.~'
tive participation by the federal judiciary was also a mistake
because, in their absence, legislation could not capture a shared
vision of the need for change. Once the judiciary was involved,
the process became a negotiation towards compromise, which is
anathema to "clear-cut directives" and "clearly specified goals."
Equally important, there was not a sufEcient empirical basis for
~ i ~ c a n tgreater
ly
specificity either as to principles and techniques or as to the measures of their effectiveness.
The RAND Report discusses CJRA principles or techniques
that were widely (or even universely) eschewed, directly or indirectly, by advisory groups and their districts:' as well as others
where, although they were the basis of plan elements, "implementation often fell short."82Quite appropriately in my view, it
suggests as possible contributing causes both the failure to include the judiciary early on in the legislative process and the related failure of commitment to the enterprise by some members
of the j~diciary.'~Absence in the conception stage augurs ab78. Id. at 33.
79. RAND REPORT,supra note 1, at 41 (footnote omitted).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 38-53.
81. See RAND REPORT,supra note 1, at 26, 28.
82. Id. at 32.
83. Id. at 34-35. Moreover, many judges were already doing many of the things
that the Brookings Task Force encouraged, which would have made it dimcult, if not
impossible, to persuade them of the worth of the enterprise, even if they had been
consulted earlier. This is a somewhat different view of both the RAND report and
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sence, actual or figurative, when the time comes to carry out
change. Reluctant players are not good candidates for leadership
of a team.
It is also important, as the RAND Report suggests, to consider the involvement and commitment of the practicing bar.84
Recall that the litigation explosion, expense, and delay stories
are the product of elites within the profession and that the profession itself is sufficiently fragmented to call the very word in
question.85Recall also that the Brookings Task Force was after
all a small group of people who presumably benefited from and
were affected by the give and take of a common enterprise in
which a powerful Senator had a stated interest. Recall finally
that, in negotiating against the workproduct of that group, the
federal judiciary was primarily concerned with its own prerogatives and a system that it had designed. This is not a recipe for
an embrace of change by the bar.
The opportunity for members of the bar (and the public) to
participate in advisory groups was "consistent with the notion of
participatory management."86 Yet, the composition of those
groups to the side, the matter may have reached a point for the
bar as a whole that was functionally equivalent to the judiciary's
opportunity to comment on the proposed legislation: a case of too
little, too late.
In any event, although active judicial leadership may be
able to change local legal culture, in its absence procedural
change is probably doomed. The RAND Report's attempt t o mediate between what it calls "culturalist" and "proceduralist"
themes by asserting that local legal culture "can be modified by

the experience studied than that taken by the Judicial Conference of the United
States in its report to Congress, which was issued after this paper was delivered.
The Conference asserted that:
The RAND study found that the pilot program per se did not appear to have
significant impact on cost or delay reduction because the courts were already
following most of the Act's principles, guidelines, and techniques and more
importantly, the cost of litigation was driven by factors other than judicial
case management procedures.
STATES, THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT OF
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED
1990, FINAL REPORT2 (May 1997) hereinafter JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
FINAL REPORT].
84. See, e.g., RAND REPORT,supra note 1, a t 36-37.
85. See supra text accompanying note 21.
86. RAND REPORT, supra note 1, a t 42.
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making the actors conform to different rules that limit discret i ~ n is
" ~ambiguous.
~
Local legal culture is shaped by both lawyers and judges, and as the Report elsewhere suggests,88and
experience with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confjrms,
federal judges do not react well to rules that limit their discreti~n.~'
In this light, it is not only the CJRA principles and techniques that were avoided and those that were implemented in
name only that should attract our attention. Both the possibility
of tepid leadership from federal judges and the short period
between the initiation of CJRA plans and the RAND study suggest that the failure of more techniques that were implemented
to have a statistically significant effect may be due in part to the
persistence of local legal culture.
To say that federal judges and practicing lawyers should be
actively involved, in a timely fashion, in conceiving and refining
proposed legislation concerning dispute resolution in the federal
courts does not tell us anything about when such legislation is
appropriate. Here again the RAND Report sheds light, although
perhaps not in the direction perceived by the judiciary when its
representatives wrote the press release spinning that document.
It is extremely useful to know that "of the total variance
explained by [the RAND] model, about 95 percent was explained
by the control variables . . . [which] means that lawyer work
hours seem to be driven primarily by factors other than case
management policy.ng0It is also useful to know that "[clase
stakes and case complexity are the most important predictors of
lawyer work hours,"91 although, why the judiciary's representatives changed stakes and complexity to "attorney perceptionsng2
escapes me.
This finding has obvious, albeit perhaps surprising, implications for the design of fbture efforts to contain litigation ex-

87. Id. at 37.
88. Id. at 36.
89. See, e.g., Burbank, Transformation, supra note 24, at 1929-34;POSNER,supra
note 20, at 125.
90. RAND REPORT,supra note 1, at 211 (alteration in original). See supra text
accompanying note 5.
91. RAND REPORT,supra note 1, at 211.
92. News Release, supra note 5, at 2.

19971

Implementing Procedural Change

239

pense, suggesting yet another reason to reexamine the premises
that in recent years have led the judiciary not simply to manage,
but to create, complex casesg3
Its more significant implications may be less obvious. For
how is it that, acting alone, the judiciary would be able to attack
the phenomenon of case stakes? More generally, if we acknowledge that "[llawyer entrepreneurs are ever anxious to create new
procedural advantages as they are alert to existing advantages[,]"" we may be led to the view, ruefully offered by a commentator on recent procedural reform efforts in England, that
only the overhaul of the system of litigation finance can consequentially attack the problem of litigation cost.95That surely is
a task for which Congress would have to take ultimate responsibility.
This finding of the RAND Report, in other words, suggests
generally that, as to some matters, effective procedural reform
may be impossible if we insist on boundaries set in advance to
mark the respective lawmaking preserves of the judiciary and
the Congress. Specifically, it highlights the critical importance of
finding ways to invest the practicing bar in the business of reform.
As to the Why and the When, it is important that key actors
in the civil justice reform debate-judges, legislators and lawyers-appreciate the significance of the RAND Report, both in
terms of its findings and as a n important event in the history of
procedural reform.
Commenting on the work of Hans Zeisel, Judge Jack
Weinstein observed that "[ilt is no sound criticism to suggest
that much of Chis jury studies] confirmed what we suspected.
Research supporting our suppositions is as valuable to policy
makers as that undercutting them."% The same is true of the
RAND Report. Indeed, confirmation (or disconfirmation) of our
suppositions is peculiarly important in this area precisely because, in the past, suppositions have so often been based on a
93. See Burbank, supra note 22, at 1476-83.
94. Burbank, supra note 13, at 517.
95. See A.A.S. Zuckerman, Lord Wmlfs Access to Justice: Plus qa change
,
59 MOD. L. REV.773, 795-96 (1996).
96. Jack B. Weinstein, Hans Zeisel's Contributions to the Administration of Justice and the Sociology of Law, 41 U . CHI. L. REV. 213, 218 n.23 (1974).
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hunch or a theory. Speaking in 1959, Michael Sovern observed:
Much of the diaculty stems from our lack of a systematized body
of knowledge on the effects of proced~aldevices. Too frequently,
when we wish to determine whether a particular remedy constitutes an improvement, we guess, we suppose, we infer, of course
we argue, and if by chance some social scientist has recently implored us to go out and get the facts, we extrapolate; but we rarely get the facts.97
The situation had not changed in 1986, when Judge Posner
wrote that "fllawyers, including judges and law professors, have
been lazy about subjecting their hunches-which in honesty we
should admit are often little better than prejudices-to systematic empirical testing."98 Nor had it changed in 1996, when
Marc Galanter observed that "[a] b d of basic information about
the working of our legal institutions, of a sort that we take for
granted in discussions of the economy, or health care, or education, simply does not exist."=
Moreover, the fact that the RAND study found that so few
techniques had statistically significant effects on measures of
interest may have broader significance. First, the finding of the
RAND Report that few techniques had a statistically significant
effect on time to disposition (delay)''' may suggest either that,
properly defined, delay in fact is not a serious problem in the
run of cases or at least that it is no more serious today than it
was before the CJRA. Indeed, other statistical data in the RAND
Report tend to confirm the latter proposition.lOl It may be,
however, that a qualitatively adequate consideration of delay
must include attention to the rate and timing of settlement.
Second, in this aspect the RAND Report may provide evi97. Michael I . Sovern, Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice, 60 COLUM.
L. REV. 50, 81 (1960).
98. Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U . CHI. L. REV. 366, 367
(1986).
99. Galanter, supra note 62, at 1155 (footnote omitted). See also JUDICIALCONFERENCE FINALREPORT, supra note 83, at 46 (limits to federal courts' ability to
effect delay reduction).
100. RAND REPORT,supra note 1, at 89-90 (Table 10.1).
101. See id. at 146 (Table C.10). One reason for this might be that many judges
were already doing many of the things that the CJRA encouraged. See supra note
83.
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dence of a phenomenon that might be called the mouse traps
that did not catch any mice; it appears that a n enormous
amount of time and effort have been devoted to devising new, or
propagating old, techniques that do not well serve the purposes
for which they were intended. If so, we all might be better off if
courts, lawyers, and litigants spent their time doing something
else. To be sure, one needs to take account of possible influences,
discussed above,'02 that may have contributed to RAND'S findings. But we should also remember that, just as 'R.AND confirmred] that many of the case management practices long employed by federal judges and incorporated into the federal rules
are effective in reducing delay,"lo3 its work calls into question
the effectiveness of other long-employed practices.lo4
Third, one of the possible influences on RAND'S findings
mentioned above merits independent attention here. We should
consider whether the time interval between the initiation of
techniques and the RAND study of experience with them was
sufficient for those techniques to take hold, even assuming a pliable local legal culture.'05 More generally, this experience suggests that a longer lead time should be given in the future for
the evaluation of newly initiated procedural techniques. That is
not good news for those who are impatient to effect change, and
hence not good news for those who believe, as I believe, that
empirical work should play a much more significant role in the
procedural lawmaking of the future than it has in the past.

102. See supra text accompanying notes 73-92.
103. News Release, supra note 5, a t 1.
104. See RAND REPORT,supra note 1, a t 89-90(Table 10.1).
105. The findings concerning initial disclosure under FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) in a
recent study of discovery conducted by the Federal Judicial Center for the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules may support this hypothesis. In that study, which was
completed after this paper was delivered and which was based upon a survey of
attorneys in civil cases that were closed during the last quarter of 1996, "more than
80% of the respondents said disclosure had a t least one of the desired effects" and
"the vast majority said the effect was in the direction intended by the drafters of
the 1993 amendments." THOMAS E. WILLGINGET AL., DISCOVERY
AND DISC~SURE
PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE:A CASE-BASED
NATIONALSURVEY
OF COUNSELIN CLOSEDFEDERAL CIVIL CASES24 (FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 1997)
(copy on file with author).
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As a result of the CJRA and of subsequent legislation, notably the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,1°6the
federal judiciary recognizes the need for cooperation when calls
for procedural change become sufficiently loud, prolonged, or
widespread to peak sustained political interest. At that point,
however, the ball may not be in their court, and by that point
the perception of a need to cooperate, rather than to consult in a
pro forma way, may not be shared by members of Congress.
Moreover, as Professor Geyh has recently and very ably pointed
out, when considering cooperation in the legislative process the
judiciary conflonts a paradox: "to maximize the flow of competent information to Congress in the legislative process and risk
credibility loss, or to preserve credibility a t the expense of competent information flo~.""~
Conversely, the fact that issues of procedural law reform
can peak sustained political interest has alerted the judiciary to
consider the power, prerogatives, and competence of Congress
when considering amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,loSbut there is currently no method in place to seek
its active cooperation in the rulemaking process. In addition, far
from helping to disengage Congress from the process of procedural rulemaking, the changes made in the 1980s, which assimilated it to the legislative process, may encourage Congress "to
second-guess the product of that process or to preempt it."lo9
The judiciary also has come to recognize the value of seeking empirical data before formulating new or amended Federal
Rules. It has not been consistent in that regard, however, and
consideration of the circumstances recalls Professor Geyh's analysis of the problem of credibility arising when judges' "efforts
coincide with personal or institutional self-interest.""'
Thus, a t the very time that the Advisory Committee was
carefully seeking facts in place of anecdotes to inform its consid106. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995) (to be codified in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. O 77).
107. Geyh, supra note 26, at 1222.
108. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 842-43.
109. Id. at 849-50 (footnote omitted).
110. Geyh, supra note 26, at 1222.
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eration of possible additional amendments to Rule 11 in the
early 1990s, it refused to heed calls to delay any amendments to
Rule 26 pending evaluation of experience under the CJRA."'
That refusal, as we have seen, more likely reflects a turf
war--or, if you wish, a struggle for "leadershipn-than a considered judgment about the value of empirical study. Nonetheless,
it weakened the judiciary's credibility both generally and in
terms of its ability to insist upon empirical data as "a neutral
counter to special pleading."lU
More representative of current attitudes, I believe, are the
Advisory Committee's decision to pull back proposed amendments to Rule 23 so as to seek additional information, both empirical data and the views of a broad spectrum of the practicing
bar (and academics),'13 and its decision to embark on a consideration of discovery reform that will be similarly modeled.'"
And one can only take heart from the recommendation in the
Report of the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning that
"[elach Advisory Committee should ground its proposals on
available data and develop mechanisms for gathering and evaluating data that are not otherwise available, and should use
these data to decide whether changes in existing rules should be
propo~ed.""~
The rulemakers' recent attitudes towards cooperation with
the practicing bar evince some of the same ambivalence seen in
the approach to empiricism, which is to say that personal or
institutional self-interest can be a dominating consideration.
Thus, some of the progress made by the Advisory Committee in
reaching out to the bar, through hearings, conferences, and
liaison positions, has been undercut by actions recently taken on
proposals to amend the Federal Rules that themselves could be

111. See Burbank, supra note 13, at 516.
112. Burbank, supra note 9, at 849.
113. See Burbank, supra note 13, at 516; see also Thomas E. Willging et al., An
Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 To Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 74, 80-82 (1996) (explaining the process leading to Federal Judicial Center
empirical study).
114. Conversation with Judge David Levi, United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California, in Tuscaloosa, A1 (Mar.21, 1997).
115. A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and
Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 168 F.RD. 679, 699 (1996).
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considered a means to build bridges to the bar and the public.
That, in any event, is one possible interpretation of the
refisal to go forward with proposals to reestablish a norm of
twelve person juries and to give lawyers a right to participate in
voir dire.l16 From this perspective, it is ironic that concerns
about courthouse construction and the personal impressions of
decision maker^^^' prevailed in the face of compelling social
science evidence that the size of the jury makes a difference.'18
And what of Congress? As I have suggested, neither the
CJRA nor the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
augurs well for a culture of cooperation with the judiciary when
issues of procedural reform have peaked sufficient political interest to motivate a serious legislative proposal. And that hardly
exhausts the list of recent statutes that invade territory previously reserved to the judiciary.'l9
On the rulemaking side, congressional liaisons are better
than nothing, but, again, there is no structural mechanism for
cooperation (as opposed to veto). Additionally, the remaking of
the rulemaking process in Congress' image may have increased
rather than decreased the likelihood that Congress will respond
to calls for it to second guess the rule maker^.^^
For those who find more apt an analogy between the current
rulemaking process and administrative lawmaking, the news is
no better, even if it does support the analogy. As part of the socalled Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996,*'
Congress created what Professor Strauss has described as "an
automatic process for generating legislative consideration of
disapproval in every case of agency rulemaking, that brings all
116. See Marcia Coyle, Ruks Would Expand Voir Dire, Civil Jury Size, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 11, 1996, at A12; Burbank, supm note 13, at 516 n.16.
117. These are the considerations that have been mentioned to me in conversations with judges who participated in the deliberations. See also Judith Resnik,
Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil
Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 A= L. REV. 133.
118. E.g., Hans ZeiseI & Shari Seidman Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1974); Richard 0.Lempert,
Uncovering "Nondiscernible"Differences:Empirical Research and the Jury Size Cases,
73 M C H . L. REV. 644 (1975).
119. E.g., Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. 8, 110
Stat. 1321 (1996) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 8 3601).
120. See supra text accompanying note 109.
121. 5 U.S.C.A. A.§ 801-808 (West Supp. 1997).
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rules before Congress for review immediately upon their adopt i ~ n . " ' ~In~ other words, Congress has extended the report and
wait system we associate with the Enabling
to all administrative rules. Although a number of Professor Strauss'
concerns about this statute resonate with recent rulemaking
experience, one is of particular interest.
Professor Strauss worries that, in response to a variety of
problems and costs associated with the new system, agencies
may
look for alternative means of accomplishing their business. They
may be motivated to substitute a large number of lower-consequence rules for "major" ones, if that can lower their oversight
or to move from legislative rulemaking, if
exposures and costs
they can, to the issuance of guidance and policies
or, most
dramatically, to achieve what they can through case-by-case adjudicati~n.~

...

. ..

The use of case-by-case adjudication to circumvent or preempt court rulemaking obstacles posed by the Enabling Act
process is not unknown.'25 More to the point, in light of experience under the CJRA we should be concerned about the "temptation to make [difficult] choices in local
and concerned
that choices made at that level will, in Professor Robel's words,
"destroy important procedural values."ln
Looking forward in terms of Congress' attitudes towards the
practicing bar and empirical data, I find no greater cause for
optimism. If there is any longer an organized bar for purposes of
taking positions on proposed court reform legislation, now that
such bills are part of broader civil justice reform agendas, it presumably would be the ABA, the prestige and influence of which
are currently at a low ebb in Washington.lB And no one, I take

122. Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American
Rukmaking, 31 WAKEFORESTL. REV. 745, 768 (1996).
123. 28 U.S.C. 3 2074 (1994).
124. Strauss, supra note 122, at 772.
125. E.g., Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985); Burbank, supra note 33, at 43740.
126. Burbank, supra note 9, at 854 (alteration in original).
127. Robel, supra note 50, at 1485.
128. E.g., N . Lee Cooper, Standing Up to Critical Scrutiny, 83 A.B.A. J., Apr.
1997, at 6.
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it, is so foolish as to see in the CJRA a principled and enduring
commitment to founding procedural reform legislation on empirical data. Those who harbor the thought should compare the record leading to, and the assumptions underlying, the 1995 Securities Litigation Reform Act with the results of the Federal Judicial Center's study of class action^.^

V. CONCLUSION:
CHANGING
THE PROCESS FOR IMPLEMENTING
PROCEDURAL
CHANGE
Considering the Who, the How, the Why, and the When, of
implementing procedural change, we are confronted with a bleak
future if we rest with current arrangements. The challenge is to
devise solutions that adequately address all of those questions
from the perspectives of all of those who are properly concerned.
For that purpose, the RAND Report is again valuable, because it
underlines the importance of actively involving all of the relevant constituencies in identifjing the need to change current
arrangements and in devising alternative arrangements.
Recent years have brought forth a number of thoughtful
proposals for changing the process by which procedural change
is conceived and effected, most recently from Professor Geyh.
His proposal for a "permanent, independent, fifteen-member
Interbranch Commission on Law Reform and the Judiciary"1so
strikes me as particularly interesting and worth serious consideration. However, it is premature to the extent that it might be
thought to preempt the process by which the vision of needed
change is cooperatively developed and recommended solutions
cooperatively determined.
That is why I have called in the past, and call again, for a
cooperative study of existing arrangements for implementing
procedural change by representatives of the three branches of
government and representatives of the practicing bar.''' I
agree with Professor Geyh that a commission on the model of

129. See, e.g., Willging et al., supm note 113, at 177-79.
130. Geyh, supra note 26, at 1234.
131. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 842, 85455; Burbank, Transformation, supm
note 24, at 1936-41;Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme
DAMEL. REV. 693, 718 (1988).
Court, Federal Ruks and Common Law, 63 NOTRE
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the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal
~~
than fixing on such
might serve well in this ~ 0 n t e x t . lRather
a body as the permanent solution to preconceived problems,
however, I would give it the limited anterior tasks of deterrnining whether there is agreement about the existence and nature
of those problems and, if so, of recommending solutions, which
might include wholly new permanent structures.
Assuming such a group shared my assessment of the inadequacy of current arrangements, and that they would not easily
be moved to recommend wholly new permanent structures of the
sort proposed by Professor Geyh, perhaps their primary task
would be to see if they could reach consensus on the proper roles
of each branch of government as initiators, makers, and implementers of procedural law. To that end, it would be necessary to
consider, among other questions, (1) the standards established
by, and the procedures for, supervisory court rulemaking under
the Rules Enabling Act, (2) the role of local court rulemaking,
and (3) the proper occasions for legislation as opposed to court
rules.
Consideration of the last question will require a serious
reexamination of the norm of trans-substantive procedure that,
It will no longer
formally at least, has held sway since 1938.133
suffice for the judiciary (or the ABA)'34 to object to legislation
like the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 by
invoking the Enabling Act process. Under current conceptions
that process could not be used to fashion prospective rules whose
application was limited to a particular substantive law context.
Moreover, in revising substantive statutory law, it is unquestionably Congress' business to consider procedural provisions that
may advance its policy 0bje~tives.l~~

132. See Geyh, supra note 26, a t 123435; Burbank, supra note 9, a t 855 n.102.
See also A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Manngement: The Chllenge of the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 877, 900 (1993) (noting that
the CJRA could stimulate the creation of a commission on the classic model charged
to develop proposals for legislative consideration).
133. See, e.g., Burbank, Transformation, supra note 24, a t 1929-41.
134. See ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION,REPORTACCOMPANYING
RESOLUTION
REAFFIRMING SUPPORT FOR THE RULESENABLING
ACT PROCESS 20 (1995).
135. See Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in
Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP.L. (forthcoming
1997).
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It would also be important for such a group to c a r e m y
address the conditions that should be deemed s f i c i e n t to
prompt any prospective procedural lawmaking and the information (including empirical data) that should be deemed a prerequisite to change. I n that regard, both the RAND Report and the
Report of the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning suggest
that the promise of empirical work in aid of civil justice reform
may lie more in its capacity to inform judgments about the need
for change than in its capacity to inform judgments about the
shape of changes that will meet a demonstrated need.13'j
According to this view, it would usually be too much-take
too much time and too much money-to expect, much less to
require, controlled experimentation or other rigorous empirical
work at the local level before adopting a n innovation a t the
national level. It should not be too much, however, to expect
credible evidence that supposed problems in fact exist--and are
not the stuff of "cosmic anecdotess-before amending the Federal
Rules or passing federal legislation. Moreover, even if we cannot
or will not very often incur the expenses necessary to do a study
like the RAND study, it may turn out that a sustained national
commitment to collect systematic civil justice data, of the sort
recommended by Professor Galanter and his colleague^,'^'
would be comparatively cost effective. For, as they point out:
The absence of an adequate knowledge base not only impairs the
optimal use of the legal system. It also makes lawyers and courts
vulnerable to political attacks. This hostility has much deeper
sources than problems of the knowledge base. But the absence of
knowledge about the legal system provides a setting in which
anger can be more easily mobilized politically and result in misguided policies. Lawyers and judges have a joint responsibility
with the academic community to foster and support the development of a cumulative body of reliable knowledge about the working of legal institutions, and they have a heavy stake in its devel0~ment.l~~

Although there has been a good deal of hysterical rhetoric

136. See RAND REPORT,supra note 1, at 1, 4;supra text accompanying note 115.
137. Marc Galanter et al., How to Improve Civil Justice Policy, 77 JUDICATURE
185 (1994).
138. Id. at 230.
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about the CJRA and the Rules Enabling Act in recent years, the
notion that the latter should be regarded as a pact or treaty
empowering and limiting both the judiciary and Congress has
much to recommend it. In order to be a n effective treaty, however, it will probably require additional amendments and, perhaps,
supplementation. One possible change that might advance a
more effective partnership between the federal judiciary and the
Congress is a mechanism for the rulemakers to propose rules for
legislative adoption (perhaps on a n expedited track).13' Such a
mechanism would be useful for proposals that either approach or
cross over the line deemed appropriate for court rules, leaving
the normal process for the usual fare (if there is such a thing
any more). It could be used by members of Congress to refer to
the rulemakers' proposals for legislation that would benefit from
thorough consideration by the judiciary but which require
Congress' ultimate judgment.
Another change that might improve the partnership is a
mechanism for fast-track rulemaking, which could be employed
when the process within the judiciary has not elicited controversy and which would probably require process alterations within
both the judiciary and the Congress."' Consideration of this
possibility might benefit from study of the recent system put in
place for review of administrative agency rules."'
Still another change that should be considered relates to the
role of the Supreme Court. The Court's performance in 1993 was
a n e m b a r a s ~ m e n t , ' ~and
~
its current posture towards
rulemaking under the Enabling Act may do more harm than
good from the point of view of congressional involvement.
Finally, it would be appropriate for such a group to consider
the problems that the fragmentation of the bar poses for any
suggested system of implementing procedural change. The President of the ABA has recently suggested that that organization
Civility,
develop or sponsor a model code of lawyer ~ivi1ity.l~~
however, is not the major problem a t the lawmaking stage; personal and professional interests are hard to subordinate. Indeed,
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Burbank, supra note 12, at 1195 n.775.
Levin, supra note 132, at 899.
supra text accompanying notes 121-27.
supra text accompanying note 59.
N . Lee Cooper, Courtesy Call, 83 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1997, at 8.
See
See
See
See
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if the group I propose were to be established, a challenge for the
appointing authorities would be precisely to find members who
would have the respect and confidence of substantial segments
of the practicing bar.
These suggestions, however, are also premature, as I am
reminded by the RAND Report that there is a metaprocedure for
implementing procedural change.

